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This paper explores the rural-urban divide, as it exists within Nebraska, which is a 
state that is largely homogenous, primarily red, with a historically sizable rural 
population that is in decline in most counties.1 Using survey data of attitudes 
towards political and economic issues, and self-identified political ideology, two 
key questions are considered. Has there been change in the rural-urban divide in 
Nebraska as rural areas lose population? Second, does the rural-urban divide 
persist when controlling for party identification, age, and income in multivariate 
analyses? Bivariate results show that the rural-urban divide continues to be an 
important factor on several issues. The multivariate analyses reveal that the rural-
urban divide remains significant when the issues are prayer and sex education in 
public schools, gun control, assisting the poor when times are bad, and choosing 
to reduce services rather than to raise taxes. The discussion considers the current 




Delineating states between red and blue has been popular over the last few decades. The media 
utilize this sorting mechanism extensively and reinforce it with electoral maps illustrating voting 
patterns by state.  Originally used to identify electoral differences between states, the delineation 
now applies to cultural distinctions between liberal and conservative states.   
                                                          
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political 
Science Association, April 17-19, 2014. 
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Researchers employ the red-blue state delineation in exploring political behavior across the 
states. Gelman et al. (2007, 365) point out that “states have real, significant cultural and political 
differences.” Further, “regional differences seem, if anything, to be getting more pronounced in 
the last decade or two.”  However, they show that the media’s simplification of the red-blue 
delineation can be “somewhat misguided” (p. 365).  For example, they note that when it comes 
to the role of income in political preferences, “income matters more in red America than in blue 
America” (p. 349).  They find rich people in poor states more likely to support Republicans, but 
in rich states income does not explain voter preference.   
 
In the third edition of Culture Wars: The Myth of a Polarized America, Fiorina (2011) continues 
to show that the masses are not as divided along the red-blue lines as so often touted in the 
media.  Rather the differences that exist are at the elite level, where polarization has become 
entrenched.  Along a similar vein, Klinkner (2004) argues that Americans are mostly still living 
in districts where electoral politics is competitive and in counties where there is considerable 
mixing of political parties.   
 
Gimpel and Karnes (2006, 467) note that recent elections show the red-blue maps really “mask a 
rural-urban divide within states.” Others describe the geographical delineation as metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan and find it helpful in understanding presidential election outcomes 
(Morrill, Knopp, and Brown, 2011).  The rural-urban divide became a national discussion with 
the publication of Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas (2004), which provides an 
examination of why Kansans support public policy from the right, which seems counter to their 
economic interests.  Frank asserts that rural Kansans place a greater emphasis on moral, rather 
than economic, issues and are willing to accept the economic consequences of supporting 
policies that are more advantageous to the wealthy instead of the working class.  
 
While Frank’s work made quite a splash in the mainstream media, several academics have 
suggested that it is flawed.  Gimpel and Karnes (2006) argue that Frank’s thesis is misguided as 
morality issues are not the sole or most dominant motivation for rural support of conservative 
policies.  They point out that the economic situation in rural America is not as dire as Frank and 
others describe. They cite life and job satisfaction studies showing rural people are more satisfied 
than urban and suburban residents.  They also see a strong entrepreneurial spirit in rural areas 
that places a premium on self-reliance and limited government intervention.  They also argue 
that rural America has actually responded quite well to economic challenges such as globalism 
and that labor market out-migration actually helps keep unemployment in small towns lower 
than in larger cities.  They conclude that Democratic policy is not only off the mark on morality 
issues but “also because many rural Americans doubt whether typical Democratic economic 
positions fit with what they believe is true about themselves and the world” (p. 471). 
 
In addressing Frank’s thesis, Bartels (2006) uses survey and election data to show reasons why 
white voters without college degrees have left the Democratic Party.  While agreeing that white 
voters without college degrees have moved from the Democrats, he argues that Frank 
misunderstands the contours of this change.  First, most of the movement has been in the South, 
reflecting a party realignment due to evolving racial politics.  Second, while there has been an 
increase in the saliency of social issues, the intensity for these issues has largely come from 
Americans with more education.  More importantly, he argues that economic concerns are more 
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salient than social issues.  Further, while white-working class voters are more supportive of 
Republican economics, they actually are more closely aligned with Democrats on social issues.    
 
Walsh (2012) uses an ethnographic approach to examine why people might vote against their 
interests. She asserts that Wisconsin is an interesting case study because while there is a long 
rural-urban divide in the state, party identification is more unsettled as some rural areas are more 
likely to identify with the Democrats. Through her participation in conversations with 37 
voluntary groups across Wisconsin over four years she finds a rural consciousness predicated on 
the perception of rural people that their deprivation is due to decisions by urban elite who are 
disrespectful of rural citizens and rural life.  For instance, in terms of increasing taxes on the 
wealthy, rural people are not against it because they believe the narrative that they might also be 
wealthy someday but rather increased taxation is a government action that is “by definition an 
injustice to themselves, and taxation only results in rewarding the antithesis of good Americans’ 
work ethic” (p. 529).  Overall, she notes that rural consciousness “can make preferences for 
limited government obvious, appropriate, and expected even among low income people” (p. 
519).  Walsh also notes that during her many conversations people did not focus on social issues 
and during her four years of study abortion was never mentioned once. 
 
More research is necessary to assess if there is rural identity across the nation or if it varies from 
region to region, blue state to red state, and within states.  Further, while the rural-urban 
dimension is helpful in assessing electoral outcomes, when anomalies (i.e., counties that run 
counter to conventional wisdom in the red-blue dimension) are considered there is evidence that 
this pattern is not inherently static (Morrill, Knopp, and Brown 2011).  That is, there can be 
change, and understanding what might lead to change is instructive.  
 
In this study, we examine Nebraska’s rural identity by comparing it to the major urban 
populations in the state.  If the assertion of the red-state/blue-state dynamic actually masks a 
rural-urban divide, it should exist even within a red state.  Nebraska provides an interesting state 
to assess this as it is a state that is largely homogenous, primarily red, with a historically sizable 
rural population that is in decline in most counties.  
 
 
The Big Red 
 
Most political observers know Nebraska as a red state.  As well they should.   Until the election 
of 2008, Nebraska had not offered an electoral vote for a Democratic candidate since 1964. From 
statehood in 1867 to 2011, Nebraska has had 36 U.S. senators, 75% of them have been 
Republican.   During the same period, Nebraska has had 100 U.S. representatives and 66% were 
Republican.2   As of 2014, Republicans hold all three House and both Senate seats in Congress 
and all of the elected executive offices at the state level.  While the unicameral legislature is 
nonpartisan, it typically contains a solid majority of Republicans.  However, Democrats have had 
somewhat more success in some key local elections in urban areas.  For instance, in 2012 the two 
largest cities in Nebraska, Lincoln and Omaha, had Democratic mayors.  
                                                          
2 Calculated from information contained in The Nebraska Bluebook. Senator George Norris is 
listed both as a Republican and an Independent Republican. 
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How Nebraskans identify by political party has changed somewhat over the last few decades.  In 
1980, Democrats made up 44% of registered voters, but that has declined nearly 11 points to just 
a third of registered voters in 2010.  Based on the data in Table 1, Republicans have not 
necessarily captured Democrats leaving the party, but rather those identifying as nonpartisan has 
increased nearly threefold from 1980 to 2010.  The percentage of voters registering as 
Republicans has changed little over the years, hovering around 50%.  
 
Table 1. Percentage of Registered Voters by Political Party 
Year Republicans Democrats Nonpartisan 
1980 49.6 44 6.4 
1990 50.5 42 7.5 
2000 49.5 36.2 14.1 
2010 48.1 33.3 18.6 
Note: Percentages tabulated from data provided by the Nebraska Secretary of State. 
 
While there have been important changes in political party status in Nebraska, there has been 
little change in how Nebraskans identify their political ideology.  According to annual surveys 
conducted by the University of Nebraska’s Bureau of Sociological Research, in 1985 40.7% of 
Nebraskans identified as conservative, 44.1% as middle of the road and 15.2% as liberal.  In 
2010, those percentages had changed only slightly to 44.9% conservative, 41.7% middle of the 
road and 13.4% liberal.3   
The perception of Nebraska as rural is largely rooted in historical references.  In the early years 
of statehood, immigrants came to Nebraska to farm and later to ranch.  Small towns grew up 
along the railroad lines to support agriculture.  However, in the last several decades Nebraskans 
have left many of the farms and small towns that dotted the prairie for metropolitan areas in the 
east or urban areas clustered along Nebraska’s lone interstate.  In 1980, about 46% of 
Nebraskans lived in rural areas, but by 2010 that number had dropped over 9 percentage points 
(USDA, 2014).4  Nebraska’s population is increasingly located in three counties in the 
southeastern part of the state (which include the cities of Omaha and Lincoln) that account for 
over half of the state’s population (Nebraska Blue Book 2011, 44). While nearly 70% of 
Nebraska counties lost population from 2000 to 2010, the two largest metropolitan areas and 
their suburbs experienced the fastest growth in the state with Omaha and Lincoln growing at 
double-digit rates (Cauchon 2011).   
The question is whether the changing nature of the rural-urban demographics in Nebraska will 
change the political dynamics of the state.  While there is not much recent literature on the 
                                                          
3 Data come from the University of Nebraska, Bureau of Sociological Research; however, the 
authors of this paper conducted the analysis presented here. Categories were collapsed putting 
those reporting very conservative with conservative and likewise for liberal.  Those reporting 
“other” were dropped from the analysis. 
4 Calculated by authors from data provided online by the USDA, Economic Service Research. 
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political landscape of Nebraska, Duffin (2011) examines how changes in population patterns, 
movement from rural to urban, affect elections to the U.S. Senate in the state.   Duffin shows that 
while Republicans hold a statewide advantage over Democrats, counties that are increasing in 
population show more support for Democratic candidates and counties with declining 
populations are supportive of Republican candidates.  She expects that in spite of Nebraska being 
tagged a red state changing population dynamics will likely insure a competitive two party 
system in Nebraska moving forward.  
 
Duffin (2011) describes demographic changes in Nebraska as they inform us about Senate 
election outcomes.  However, this paper focuses on political attitudes of Nebraskans over time, 
place, party and demographics (age and income).   We consider two research questions.  First, 
has there been change in the rural-urban divide in Nebraska? Second, does the rural-urban divide 
persist when controlling for party identification, age and income? 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data come from survey research conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research (BOSR) 
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. BOSR has been conducting an annual survey of 
Nebraska, the Annual Social Indicators Survey, for several decades.5  Until the last few years the 
survey was administered over the telephone and now it is through the mail.  This study employs 
unweighted data from the 1982 survey and the 2012 survey.  In order to compare changing 
political attitudes over time, 2012 questions replicate 1982 questions.   In 2012, the sample was 
purchased by the BOSR from Survey Sampling International, with 3319 cases deemed eligible 
and deliverable and 954 respondents. The response rate for cases eligible and deliverable was 
28.7%.  The representativeness of the sample was acceptable in terms of the region of the state 
and sex but the survey overrepresents people over the age of 65 and underrepresents people from 
19-44.  Based on 2010 Census estimates, 46.4% of Nebraskans are aged 19-44 and 18.4% are 
aged 65 and over, but in the survey the percentages are 21.3% for 19-44 and 34.5% for 65 and 
over.  Women are slightly more represented in the sample than in Census estimates (54.2% in the 
sample and 50.4% in the Census) and people in the Omaha area were slightly underrepresented 
in the sample, 38.8% in the sample to 41.5% in the survey (Bureau of Sociological Research 
2012). 
 
The main independent variable of interest is rural-urban.  This study measures rural and urban 
somewhat differently than typical.  Respondents are categorized into two groups. The urban 
grouping consists of only three counties of the state’s 93 counties.  As noted above, these urban 
counties are by far the most populated counties in the state and are home to the two major urban 
areas Omaha and Lincoln.  All other respondents are placed into the rural grouping.  This 
categorization is justified for a few reasons.  First, the urban grouping includes Omaha and 
Lincoln, which are the commerce and political centers of the state.  This is important because 
Walsh (2012) reports that rural consciousness is rooted in the rural perception of elite urban 
                                                          
5 The authors thank the Bureau of Sociological Research at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
for access to survey data, and accept responsibility for analysis and interpretation of the data and 
any errors or omissions. 
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status.  If it is assumed that Nebraska has an elite urban status in the Lincoln and Omaha areas, 
this delineation of urban and rural allows for distinguishing between those people who live 
outside of the area of elite status with those who live inside the area of elite status.  Second, as 
noted, most counties are experiencing out-migration but these urban counties saw double digit 
increases; thus the counties are clearly emerging as population centers of the state. There are 
other areas with growing metropolitan populations but they are not part of the commercial and 
political elite.  
 
The dependent variables are measures of attitudes on selected political and economic issues.  In 
1982, the BOSR survey included several questions regarding attitudes of timely issues (abortion, 
sex education, prayer in public schools, gun control, support for the military, assistance to the 
poor and taxes).  In order to assess if there had been change over time in terms of these attitudes, 
several relevant questions were replicated in 2012, with only a few minor modifications.  A four-
point Likert response set measures attitudes.  The 1982 question had a “neutral don’t know” 
response and the 2012 question had a “don’t know” response.  In both years, those response 
categories are excluded from the analysis. Another dependent measure is political ideology, 
where respondents self-identified on the political liberal-conservative spectrum. 
 
After an examination of the distributions on the political attitudes for the state as a whole in 
2012, crosstab and chi-square testing examine the differences between urban and rural on the 
measures of political attitudes and ideology comparing results from 1982 and 2012.  Next, using 
the 2012 data, a set of logistic regressions assess how rural-urban currently affects political 
attitudes where the response set is dichotomized into those who agree and strongly agree into one 
group and those who disagree and strongly disagree in the other. Age, income, and party 




Table 2 shows results from the 2012 questions for the overall sample.  It is intriguing that over 
77% agree/strongly agree that abortion is a private decision and should not be regulated by 
government.  This is a counterintuitive finding as Nebraska is considered one of the stronger pro-
life states in terms of legislation by the ranking of Americans United for Life (Ertelt 2014). 
Further, the Midwest (which includes Nebraska) is only behind the South Central states in 
showing the least amount of public support for abortion (Pew Research Center 2013).  The 
results on abortion attitudes found here is possibly due to the question wording.  Arguably the 
question is not a valid measure of abortion attitudes, as the statement is potentially leading, 
confusing, and/or double-barreled.  On the other hand, it might be that while Nebraskans are 
against abortion, they are even more firmly against government regulation. Thus, the question 
might best be considered a measure of support for government regulation.    
 
Nebraskans are typically patriotic and supportive of the military and about 50% support 
increasing spending on the military.  Almost 54% disagree/strongly disagree in “strict” gun 
control and less than 47% reported support for prayer in public schools.   There is a significant 
amount of support for sex education in public schools.  Just over 54% support cutting services 
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rather than raising taxes and less than two in ten believe that the poor should take care of 
themselves during tough times. 
 
Table 2.  Nebraska Attitudes on Selected Political Issues 2012 (in percentages) 
  SA A D SD 
Whether to have an abortion is a strictly private decision, which 
should not be regulated by government one way or another. 
50.1 27.6 9.7 12.6 
The United States should increase spending for military defense. 14.6 36.1 38.6 10.7 
The country would be better off if we had strict gun control laws. 17.8 28.2 23.4 30.5 
The public schools should conduct prayers as part of their official 
business. 
18.1 28.6 32.4 21.0 
Sex education classes taught by qualified teachers should be offered to 
students in all public schools. 
33.6 51.3 10.1 4.9 
During bad times the poor should take care of themselves. 3.2 16.1 53.2 27.5 
Government should reduce services rather than raise taxes. 20.1 34.0 31.8 14.1 
 
The next set of tables (3a-3h) examine the same questions at two different time periods (1982 
and 2012) and between regions (urban and rural), which addresses the first research question of 
whether or not there has been a change in the rural-urban dynamic over time.  For example, the 
1982 chi-square in Table 3a signifies a statistically significant difference between rural and 
urban attitudes in that year.   
 
Table 3a. Abortion Should Not Be Regulated By Government (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n=721 ) 29.8 47.6 15.5 7.1 
2012 (n=364) 50.5 29.1 10.7 9.6 
Rural 
1982 (n=1074) 18.9 54.1 19.2 7.8 
2012  (n=382) 49.7 26.2 8.6 15.4 
1982 Chi-square = 29.210(.000) 
2012 Chi-square = 6.468(.091) 
 
Table 3a shows that the in both 1982 and 2012 strong majorities of Nebraskans agree/strongly 
agree that abortion is a private matter that should not be regulated by government.  Interestingly, 
both rural and urban residents were much more likely to strongly agree in 2012 than in 1982.  As 
noted, this is possibly measuring an anti-government regulation sentiment more than an abortion 
sentiment. The chi-square testing shows significant differences between urban and rural in 1982 
but not in 2012. 
 
Table 3b shows statistically significant differences between urban and rural in both years but not 
large differences.  In both urban and rural areas, there was more support for military spending in 
1982 than in 2012 but in 2012 the differential between rural and urban support widened with 
rural residents more supportive of increased spending.   Table 3c shows that gun control 
perceptions have changed over time.  In urban areas in both 1982 and 2012, about 60% 
agree/strongly agree that gun control is good for the country.  However, urban people were 
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nearly twice as likely to strongly disagree with gun control in 2012 as they were in 1982, but 
strong disagreement was still less than 20%.   Those who agree/strongly agree with gun control 
in rural areas dropped about nine points from 1982 to 2012.  The most dramatic change was in 
the percentage that strongly disagree in rural areas, increasing nearly two and a half times from 
1982 (16.9%) to 2012 (42.2%).  Strong disagreement in rural areas is over 23 points higher in 
rural than urban areas.  Gun control has clearly become a very salient issue, particularly in rural 
areas. 
 
Table 3b. The US Should Increase Military Defense Spending (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n=720 ) 15.1 47.5 29.0 8.3 
2012 (n=334) 12.9 31.7 42.5 12.9 
Rural 
1982 (n=1058) 14.4 53.7 27.8 4.2 
2012  (n=339) 16.2 40.4 34.8 8.6 
1982 Chi-square = 16.375(.001)  
2012 Chi-square = 10.325(.016) 
 
Table 3c. The Country Would Be Better Off With Strict Gun Control (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n=720 ) 19.3 41.4 30.6 8.8 
2012 (n=350) 23.7 36.0 21.7 18.6 
Rural 
1982 (n=1072) 8.0 33.5 41.6 16.9 
2012  (n= 358) 12.0 20.7 25.1 42.2 
1982 Chi-square = 86.083 (.000) 
2012 Chi-square = 61.557(.000) 
 
Rural areas have become much more likely to support prayer in public schools (Table 3d).  In the 
1982 data only 6% strongly support prayer in public schools but that grew to nearly a quarter of 
rural residents supporting it in 2012.  Again, there are statistically significant differences 
between urban and rural in both years.  There is not much change in support for sex education in 
public schools (Table 3e); it remains strong in both urban and rural areas, but urban areas are 
more likely to strongly support sex education in public schools and strong support for sex 
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Table 3d. Public Schools Should Conduct Prayers (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n=710 ) 5.9 29.9 50.4 13.8 
2012 (n=346) 11.3 27.5 35.3 26.0 
Rural 
1982 (n=1081) 6.1 37.6 49.9 6.5 
2012  (n=346) 24.9 29.8 29.5 15.9 
1982 Chi-square = 31.942(.000) 
2012 Chi-square = 28.229(.000)  
 
Table 3e. Sex Education Should Be Offered in Public Schools (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n= 729) 28.4 54.5 12.6 4.5 
2012 (n=373) 40.2 49.3 7.5 2.9 
Rural 
1982 (n=1087) 16.5 55.9 20.9 6.7 
2012  (n=376) 27.1 53.2 12.8 6.9 
1982 Chi-square = 49.222(.000) 
2012 Chi-square = 21.142(.000) 
 
The next two tables examine attitudes regarding economic issues.  The comparison between 
1982 and 2012 is somewhat complicated by a slightly different response set for the questions 
(refer to notes under each table).   Regarding the poor taking care of themselves in bad times 
(Table 3f), both urban and rural areas largely disagree that the poor should be on their own.  
There are statistically significant differences between rural and urban in 1982 but not in 2012.  In 
terms of reducing services instead of raising taxes (Table 3g) both urban and rural areas dropped 
about 15 percentage points in their agreement, meaning that they were less likely to support 
reducing services over raising taxes in 2012 than they were in 1982.   
 
Table 3f. During Bad Times the Poor Should Take Care of Themselves  
(in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n=358 )  19.6 80.4  
2012 (n=352) 2.8 13.1 54.5 29.5 
Rural 
1982 (n=549)  28.8 71.2  
2012  (n=358) 3.6 19.0 52.0 25.4 
Note: In 1982 the response was only agree or disagree. 
1982 Chi-square = 9.802(.002) 
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Table 3g. Reduce Services Instead of Raising Taxes (in percentages) 
 SA A D SD 
Urban 
1982 (n= 615) 34.3 28.9 21.1 15.6 
2012 (n=339) 17.4 30.4 36.9 15.3 
Rural 
1982 (n=936) 40.5 35.4 17.0 7.2 
2012 (n=343) 22.7 37.6 26.8 12.8 
1982 Chi-square = 37.049(.000) 
2012 Chi-square = 11.211(.011) 
 
Note: The 1982 question asked if the respondent preferred raising taxes or reducing services 
with a response set of raise taxes (strongly), raise taxes (not strongly), reduce services (not 
strongly), reduce services (strongly).  For comparisons the 1982 response set is put into the 
Likert formula following the corresponding order of the 1982 response set.  That is, raising taxes 
(strongly agree) is considered reducing services (strongly disagree). 
 
Table 3h looks at changes in political ideology over time.  Compared to 1982, urban areas are 
significantly less likely to report being conservative, moving into the moderate category.  To a 
smaller degree, rural residents are less likely to report being conservative in 2012 versus 1982, 
also moving into the moderate category.  For both rural and urban there was very little increase 
in those reporting liberal.    
 
Table 3h. Political Ideology (in percentages) 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Urban    
1982 (n=506 ) 21.7 26.3 52.0 
2012 (n=335) 25.1 37.6 37.3 
Rural     
1982 (n=743) 14.3 29.5 56.3 
2012  (n=334) 15.0 35.9 49.1 
1982 Chi-square = 11.819(.003) 
2012 Chi-square = 14.035(.001) 
 
Addressing the second research question, Table 4 provides the results of seven logistic 
regressions where the dichotomized dependent variables are the political attitude questions from 
the bivariate analyses. The rural-urban variable is coded 1 (rural) and 0 (urban).  Party 
identification has two dummy variables (Democrat; Independent) with Republican as the 
reference group.  Age consists of three dummy variables (less than 35 years old; 35-49 years old; 
over 65 years old) with ages 50-64 as the reference group.  Income has four dummy predictors 
(less than $25,000; $25,000-39,999; $40,000-59,999; $60,000-74,999) with income $75,000 and 
over as the reference group.     
 
With the dependent variables having the disagree responses taking the value 1 in the data, a 
positive sign on an independent variable coefficient in the logistic regression means the 
variable’s influence on the respondents is to have the respondent more likely to disagree and a 
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negative sign on a coefficient means the respondent is less likely to disagree.  Moreover, the 
exponential transformation of a coefficient gives the odds ratio of disagreeing to agreeing, 
controlling for other factors.  A ratio greater than 1 means the odds of disagreeing grows and a 
ratio less than 1 means the odds of disagreeing is reduced.  (When the exponential transformation 
is less than 1, the inverse of the transformation gives the odds of agreeing.)  
 
After controlling for party identification, age and income, the difference between rural and urban 
remains significant for prayer and sex education in public schools, gun control, assisting the poor 
when times are bad, and choosing to reduce services rather than to raise taxes (see Table 4).  
From the regression coefficients, odds ratios are calculated in the context of each variable. In 
terms of prayer, being a rural resident reduces the odds of disagreeing that prayer should be 
allowed in public school by nearly 1.5 times, which is calculated by taking 1/.672 (Exp β), while 
being rural increases the odds of disagreeing that sex education should be in public schools by 
1.7 times.   The rural-urban variable has its most striking difference with regards to gun control. 
Rural residents are almost three times more likely to disagree that strict gun control would be 
good for the country.  The odds of disagreeing that the poor should be provided assistance during 
bad times decreases 1.53 times for rural respondents and decreases 1.55 times for rural 
respondents when considering if government should reduce services rather than raise taxes.   
 
The results from the control variables are instructive as well.  When interpreting the control 
variables, it is important to note that the regression coefficients and significance values 
represents relationships between each respective dummy variable and the reference group.  First, 
there are no real surprises when it comes to party identification.  On every measure, there are 
significant differences between party identification and in the expected direction.  Perhaps most 
interesting is that Independents are more liberal than Republicans on nearly every issue, 
suggesting that Independents in Nebraska are a distinct group and not just necessarily 
Republicans without a party identification but rather a group that perceives issues differently 
than Republicans. 
 
Most striking in terms of age is that there is little difference between the age groupings compared 
with the reference group of those from 50-64 except for those under people under the age of 35.  
Compared to the reference group of those 50-64, respondents, the under 35-age group is about 
two times more likely to disagree that abortion is a private matter that should not be regulated by 
government.  That same age group around twice as likely as those 50-64 to disagree with prayer 
in public schools and with gun control.   
 
Income does not play a large role in explaining differences in attitudes and has no significant 
effects in terms of abortion attitudes and the poor taking care of themselves.  However, there are 
some intriguing differences.  Compared to the reference group of those making over $75,000, 
those making under $25,000 a year are about twice as less likely to disagree with prayer in public 
schools. In terms of sex education, those in the $60,000-74,999 bracket are nearly three times 
less likely as the reference group to disagree with having sex education in public schools.   Those 
making between $40,000-59,999 are almost twice as likely to disagree with gun control and 
those making $25,000-39,999 are about two and a half times more likely to disagree that 
government should reduce services rather than to raise taxes. 
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The final regression is OLS with the dependent variable being a five point scale of 
liberalism/conservatism ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative).   As seen in Table 
5, there is not a significant difference between urban and rural when controlling for party, age 
and income.  As expected, Democrats are significantly more likely to be liberal than 
Republicans.  Independents also report being more liberal than Republicans.  The only age group 
that is statistically significant from the reference group (ages 50-64) is those under 35 but the 
effect as measured by the unstandardized regression coefficient (B) is not that strong.  
Interestingly, income groupings play no role in predicting political ideology. 
 
Table 5. Multiple Regression Predicting Political Ideology 
  B S.E. t /p-value beta 
Rural .088 .064 1.378/.169 .044 
Democrat -1.393 .074 -18.944/.000*** -.645 
Independent -.798 .078 -10.213/.000*** -.346 
Age     
   Less than 35years old -.271 .105 -2.586/.010* -.086 
   35-49 years old -.143 .089 -1.611/.108 -.055 
   65 and over years old .014 .076 .180/.857 .006 
Income     
  <$25,000 .015 .095 .156/.876 .006 
  $25,000-39,999 -.034 .104 -.324/.746 -.011 
  $40,000-59,999 .068 .085 .802/.423 .028 
  $60,000-74,999 .151 .101 1.502/.134 .051 




This paper explores two questions.   Has there been change in the rural-urban divide in Nebraska 
as the state becomes less rural? Second, does the rural-urban divide persist when controlling for 
party identification, age, and income?  Regarding the first question, crosstab and chi-square 
significance testing shows that rural and urban were significantly different on all measures in 
1982; in 2012, they were still significantly different on most issues except abortion and whether 
or not the poor should take care of themselves during bad times.  Rural and urban differences are 
particularly strong in terms of gun control, with rural residents showing a much stronger 
rejection of gun control in 2012 than in 1982.  Rural areas have also become much more likely to 
support prayer in public schools.  
 
Results from the multivariate analyses for the 2012 data show that the rural- urban difference is 
important even when controlling for party identification, age, and income.  The difference 
between rural and urban remains significant for prayer and sex education in public schools, gun 
control, assisting the poor when times are bad, and choosing to reduce services rather than to 
raise taxes.  Gun control is a major issue in separating rural and urban with rural respondents 
three times more likely to disagree with gun control.  However, when it comes to ideology the 
rural-urban distinction is no longer significant when controls enter into the analysis.   
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As noted the control variables provide some interesting insights.  First, on nearly all of the 
attitudinal questions Democrats and Independents have positions that are significantly different 
than Republicans.  When comparing odds ratios Democrats are more strongly different from 
Republicans than Independents but there are important differences between Independents and 
Republicans. On political ideology it is not surprising to see that Democrats are significantly 
more liberal than Republicans.  Those reporting being Independent also report being more liberal 
than Republicans, which is also to be expected.  However, in total these findings suggest that 
Democrats and Republicans need to see Independents as a separate group that has differing 
views of issues that make them overall more moderate than the parties, at least on these issues. 
With Democrats having a steep decline in identification over time and Republicans having a 
strong but not increasing identification, Independents have become very important in elections 
and have the power to make the state more competitive.  
 
Overall age does not have a strong impact on attitudes and ideology.  However, those under the 
age of 35 are a group that is somewhat distinct from the reference group of people aged 50-64, at 
least when it comes to abortion, prayer in schools, gun control and ideology.  Younger people 
take a more liberal position on prayer in public school but are much less supportive of gun 
control.  On the abortion issue the results are somewhat difficult to ascertain given the question 
wording.  If you look at the question as measuring abortion attitudes they are less likely to 
support a pro-choice position, but if you look at it as a government regulation question, they 
seem to be more supportive of government regulation.  There are two important takeaways from 
this.  First, the under age 35 is a unique group compared to the age 50-64 category and more 
research needs to be done as they do not neatly fit the liberal/conservative dichotomy.  Future 
research should look at the differences between all age groups.  Second, if the group continues to 
hold nuanced views, Nebraska’s political future may become a bit more unpredictable for 
partisans.  All of this, however, should be taken with some caution because the sampling in this 
survey underrepresents this age group.   
 
Income is not an important predictor of attitudes, with a few exceptions as described above.  
While Gelman et al. (2007) assert that income matters more in red areas than blue when it comes 
to voting, it does not play a large role in terms of the political attitudes examined here.  Since 
income is only a control in this study, more research looking at political attitudes and income 
directly would help address more clearly the role income plays in forming attitudes.  Also, it 
would be helpful to see how income interacts, not just within political attitudes, but also voting 
behavior in the state.  
 
Overall, this paper reveals that in terms of some key measures of political attitudes, the rural-
urban divide matters in Nebraska even though it is a largely homogenous, red state with a strong 
rural background.  On some measures the differences are not large but in the case of gun control, 
and to a lesser extent prayer in public schools, the differences have grown; in other areas, such as 
abortion and whether or not the poor should take care of themselves the differences have gone 
away.   
 
It is hard to estimate how the rural-urban divide will develop if urban areas in Nebraska continue 
to grow while many rural counties continue a decline.  However, it is reasonable to assume that 
attitudinal differences will likely either remain or expand slightly. In terms of gun control, it is 
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likely that the difference will stay strong as gun issues have become a very important issue for 
rural areas. Urban areas, particularly Omaha, might be more inclined to support gun control 
because of high rate of murders of African Americans.  In fact, in 2011 Nebraska had a black 
homicide rate twice the national average, with 27 murders taking place in Omaha (Burbach 
2014).  Or it could be that the differences capture a part of the rural consciousness described by 
Walsh (2012) in that rural people see gun control as just another intervention by urban elites into 
their daily affairs.  The other differences between rural and urban remaining even when 
controlling for party identification, age and income might also be tapping into a rural identity 
that needs exploration with qualitative analysis. 
 
Do the findings here help suggest how electoral politics might be changing in Nebraska?  Duffin 
(2011) shows rural and urban differences in voting and the results here show differences on 
attitudes towards key issues that likely affect electoral politics. If Nebraska continues to become 
increasingly urban, it is likely that Nebraska will again become a competitive two party system 
as Duffin speculates.  However, the current landscape for Democrats is challenging as seen in the 
2012 U.S. Senate election.  Former Nebraska senator, presidential candidate, and national figure 
Bob Kerrey was handily defeated by his Republican opponent Deb Fisher.  Kerrey had been out 
of the state for several years living in New York as the president of the New School. While 
Kerrey had been both a popular governor and later senator and an honored veteran of the 
Vietnam War, he did very poorly in rural Nebraska.  Kerrey did well in the urban parts of the 
state, winning the two largest metropolitan counties (Lancaster and Douglas) but Fischer handily 
beat him in the rural areas (Tysver and Goodsell 2012).   One of the monikers used against 
Kerrey was “New York Bob” a reference to the fact that he left the state to live in an urban, 
elitist area, potentially illustrating the findings of Walsh (2012).  The differences between rural 
and urban were evident in this election, which show that if Democrats are going to be 
competitive, they will need to sell their message in rural areas as well as urban and in recent 
times they have not done that effectively.   
 
The 2014 gubernatorial election provides an interesting test case for whether or not Democrats 
can appeal to the rural electorate.  The Kerry-Fisher race pitted an urban Democrat against a 
rural Republican. This race matches an urban Republican, Pete Ricketts, against a rural 
Democrat, Chuck Hassebrook (Schmidt 2014).  Ricketts grew up in Omaha (Schmidt 2014) and 
received his undergraduate education at the University of Chicago (Smith 2013).  After receiving 
his MBA from the University of Chicago, Rickets worked in Omaha for the Union Pacific 
Railroad and later at Ameritrade (Schmidt 2014), a large Omaha-based brokerage firm founded 
by his father.  His family also owns the Chicago Cubs (Smith 2013).  Some Democrats have 
seized upon Rickets background, with their own moniker of “Wall Street Pete” (Schmidt 2014). 
His opponent Chuck Hassebrook grew up on a farm in rural Nebraska, was educated at the 
University of Nebraska, and spent his professional career working in rural Nebraska at the 
Center for Rural Affairs, which is a national advocacy organization that focuses on promoting 
family farms and ranches, along with rural economic development. Hassebrook has held elected 
office, serving for 18 years on the Board of Regents for the University of Nebraska (Schmidt 
2014).  If Hassebrook runs competitively, or wins because of a strong showing in rural Nebraska, 
Democrats may be able to see a future in rural Nebraska.  On the other hand, if he loses soundly 
in rural Nebraska, it will be hard for Democrats to imagine a better candidate to get the message 
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to rural voters.  If Ricketts does well in rural Nebraska it may mean that party identification and 
policy issues trump a candidate’s rural identity.   
 
Limitations 
While this paper provides some interesting results for how the rural-urban divide plays out in a 
red state, there are problems. First, there are only seven measures of attitudes used in the study 
and one, the abortion question, has problems with validity.  Second, the response rate for the 
survey was not high and the sample included an overrepresentation of older Nebraskans and an 
underrepresentation of younger Nebraskans, which is typical in a mail survey, but concerning 
when making inferences to the population.  Third, the results from one state allow for a richer 
understanding of that state but comparisons to other states would improve the clarity of the 
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